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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of benefit-cost analysis has expanded over the last twenty five years and now 
plays a key role in the formulation of new regulations, even regulations for the protection 
of human health.  Regulatory decision making is, of necessity, based on pre-regulatory 
paper studies of costs and benefits.  There has been relatively little post-regulatory 
validation of these benefit-cost estimates, but what little information is available indicates 
that they are most often inaccurate.  Roughly half of such estimates have been found to 
over-estimate costs by failing to anticipate technological change driven by the regulation.  
Roughly a quarter of studies underestimated costs by failing to anticipate unintended 
consequences of the regulation.  Estimates of benefits are often impossible to verify even 
after the regulation is imposed as they involve small changes in cancer rates that are not 
distinguishable from random fluctuations in epidemiological data.   
 
Basing decisions on a tool that is so often in error would appear to be ill advised.  
Unfortunately the alternatives are not very attractive.  Basing decisions on absolute 
standards of health protection does not allow for the prioritization of limited resources.  
In practice it can result either in overly strict regulation, in the hopes of completely 
eliminating risk, or in inaction, as regulators wait for absolute scientific certainty before 
imposing stringent and costly regulations. 
 
An alternate regulatory procedure based on incremental regulatory changes is described 
and statutory changes proposed to give EPA discretionary authority to adopt such a 
strategy for setting drinking water standards.  This strategy will aim to avoid large, 
irreversible investments with uncertain benefits.  This strategy will shift the emphasis 
from the largely inaccurate pre-regulatory benefit-cost assessments towards ongoing 
studies of regulatory impacts that will provide feedback to governmental agencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As a result of the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, the federal 
government assumed responsibility for setting legally enforceable drinking water 
standards, known as Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs).  In doing so, the federal 
government took upon itself a complicated task for which the appropriate methodologies 
and criteria are still being worked out.  Any attempt to set drinking water standards must 
somehow balance human life and health with the monetary costs of achieving the 
standards.  The 1986 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act provided that MCLs 
should be as close to absolutely protective of human health as technically and 
economically feasible.  This standard setting process is attractive in that it clearly and 
explicitly places a priority on protecting human health.  However, this approach does not 
allow for prioritization of different health risks and the investment of limited resources in 
areas where they will have the greatest benefits.   
 
In the decades following the passage of the Safer Drinking Water Act, EPA established 
an increasing number of drinking water standards and made existing standards more 
stringent (Cotruvo and Vogt 1990).  Some of these standards, particularly the Surface 
Water Treatment Rule and the Lead and Copper Rule (Auerbach 1994) imposed 
significant financial burdens on those water systems affected by the rule.  In the mid-
1990’s standards for a number of contaminants including arsenic, radionuclides, 
disinfection byproducts, and sulfate were under consideration (EPA 1994, EPA 1998a-c, 
EPA 2000, EPA 2001).  These include wide-spread, naturally occurring contaminants 
(e.g., arsenic, sulfate, and some radionuclides) to which humans have long been exposed.  
While feasible technologies exist to address these contaminants, implementing lower 
standards on a national scale has promised to be very expensive and to offer uncertain 
health benefits.   
 
 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
 
In response to this situation, the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act 
changed the standard setting process.  While EPA was still required to identify the most 
protective level that would be feasible to achieve, the EPA administrator was given 
discretionary authority to set an MCL less protective of human health than feasible, if 
justified by a benefit-cost analysis.  Benefit-cost analysis is an economic tool that 
involves monetizing the cost and benefits of alternative options and comparing the 
aggregate costs with the aggregate benefits.  While benefit-cost analyses had been 
required for all regulatory actions since 1981 under Executive Order 12291, the results of 
these analyses did not have the legal ability to influence the standard setting process until 
1996.  The use of benefit-cost analysis in setting environmental and health standards has 
been controversial.  Executive Order 12291 was perceived by environmentalists as a 
barrier placed by the Reagan Administration to hinder environmental protection (Eads 
and Lave 1999).  In addition, performing benefit-cost analyses on regulatory standards 
relating to human health and safety inevitable involves assigning a monetary value to 
human life, a difficult task and one opposed in principle by some people. 
 
Perhaps the most significant concern with benefit-cost analysis is that accurate estimates 
of both the costs and benefits of a regulation are difficult to anticipate.  A recent study 
(Harrington et al. 2000) compared cost estimates made by the appropriate regulatory 
agency before the regulation was implemented with cost estimates made after the rule 
was implemented for 25 different regulations.  For 18 of the 25 rules the pre-regulation 
estimates of unit pollution control costs were inaccurate.  Inaccuracy was defined as the 
post-regulation cost estimate being outside of the error bounds of the pre-regulation 
estimate, or for point estimates, a difference of greater than 25% between the pre-rule and 
post-rule regulatory cost estimates.  Of these eighteen, in twelve cases costs were 
overestimated and in six cases costs were underestimated.   
 
The lack of accuracy of pre-regulatory cost estimates raises questions as to whether 
benefit-cost analysis is a reliable tool for regulatory decision making.  However, restoring 
the pre-1996 criterion of technical and economic feasibility would not necessarily 
improve the situation.  Instead it would remove the one tool that EPA has to avoid highly 
cost-ineffective standards.   
 
 
REGULATING INCREMENTALLY 
 
An alternative approach would be to view drinking water standards, not as fixed values 
informed by certain knowledge, but as perpetually interim values that reflect scientific 
knowledge and technological capabilities at a given point in time.  This would reduce the 
burden on pre-regulatory estimates of costs and benefits.  The task of such an assessment 
would not be to see into the future and discern the precise value for the standard but to 
identify the most promising direction for altering the standard and to make an educated 
guess as to how far one might reasonable move in the desired direction.  Too small an 
incremental change would risk the need for further adjustments in the same direction, 
while too large a change would risk overshooting the mark. 
 
To some extent standards are already viewed in this way.  The most notable example is 
the regulation of disinfection byproducts and microbial pathogens.  The 1996 
amendments set up a two-stage process in which interim rules were promulgated 
followed by long term rules several years later (EPA 2003).  In addition, EPA is required 
to review all standards on a seven year basis and revise them as appropriate given the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge. In general, however, EPA is not given 
explicit authority to take incremental action that is likely to improve public health, in 
preference to risky attempts to guess the optimal value of a regulatory standard in the 
face of large uncertainties.  It might be possible to justify such incremental actions using 
the benefit-cost provision of the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act.  
EPA could estimate the benefits of a two-stage process in which an incremental change is 
made to the MCL and then, based on new information acquired about the actual impact of 
the standard, the MCL is further adjusted or left as is at the end of seven years.  However, 
EPA has shown no inclination to pursue this type of analysis, with considerable 
justification.  The inputs for such an analysis would be highly complex and uncertain, 
particularly estimates of the extent to which the initial rule would improve the accuracy 
of the costs estimates used for subsequent rule making efforts.  In addition, EPA would 
have little flexibility in how to incrementally adjust regulations.  This lack of flexibility 
could lead to inefficient implementation of regulatory changes.  Currently MCLs apply to 
all sizes and classes of water suppliers.  Rather than simply regulating in temporal 
increments, it might be more efficient to promulgate regulations that apply to 
incrementally broader classes of water supplies over time.  This would avoid presenting 
individual utilities with a moving regulatory target.  Incremental regulation is likely to be 
highly inefficient if utilities make capital investments to achieve one standard, and then 
must make additional capital investments to achieve an incrementally more stringent 
standard several years later.  Instead regulations could be phased in by targeting the 
largest utilities first, or the ones with the most serious problems.  For example, the arsenic 
standard could have been set at 10 µg/l but initially applied only to supplies with arsenic 
levels greater than 20 µg/l.  This would focus attention and resources on utilities where 
the greatest problem exists.  By setting a target of 10 µg/l, the regulators would make 
clear to potential vendors the eventual size of the market and thereby encourage research 
and development expenditures.  Similarly, utilities would be able to plan to meet the 
eventual target of 10 µg/l, rather than first adopting one treatment process to meet an 
initial standard, and then re-investing in a different process to achieve the next standard.   
 
In order to design innovative regulatory approaches, EPA will need statutory authority 
that provides it with more flexibility in designing regulations.  It is proposed here to 
amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to provide for a three-stage regulatory standard 
setting process.  The first two stages would be identical to the existing process.  The 
feasible level would be determined in the first step, and any adjusts based on benefit-cost 
considerations made in the second step, at the discretion of the EPA administrator.  The 
third step proposed here would apply to cases where the costs and benefits were 
uncertain, such that the costs of the standard might well exceed the benefits.  In these 
situations, the EPA administrator would be given discretionary authority to implement a 
less stringent, interim rule where the benefits are more likely to exceed the costs.  
Whenever possible, EPA should designate a target level and time frame.  The interim rule 
should be compatible with subsequent regulatory action designed to achieve levels more 
protective of human health.  This might involve selective application of the interim 
standard to protect highly exposed populations or application to those areas most able to 
comply with the rule without suffering excessive costs or other undesired impacts of the 
regulation. 
 
An incremental action with clearly positive net benefits should be less controversial than 
a definitive rule with an uncertain net impact.  This may help EPA to avoid becoming 
entangled in lengthy and expensive disputes that involve seemingly endless studies and 
re-evaluations of proposed regulatory actions.  By pursuing a larger number of rules with 
clear benefits, the EPA may in the long run be able to be more effective at protecting 
health and the environment.  It took 27 years from the passage of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act and multiple lawsuits before EPA revised the arsenic drinking water standard.  
Perhaps the great effort and expense involved in determining this single standard could 
have been better spent identifying a larger number of less controversial steps to protect 
human health and the environment.   
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The modifications to the Safe Drinking Water Act proposed here would provide EPA 
with the ability to pursue incrementally beneficial regulatory changes without the need to 
see into the future and precisely predict the optimal value of a standard based on a 
benefit-cost analysis.  The ability to take action would allow for improved knowledge of 
the true costs of the regulation and provide incentives for the development of new 
technologies to comply with the rule.  Incremental approaches are not always appropriate, 
as they may diminish possible economies of scale, or delay needed health and 
environmental benefits.  However, they do offer an opportunity to take limited beneficial 
action when the benefits of more stringent action are uncertain and likely to be disputed. 
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